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Abstract
FMECA is commonly used as a tool for assessing the consequences of different failure modes of a
component and the criticality of the consequences. Traditionally failure modes are generated using
a one-factor-at-a-time method. In this study, we propose extensions to the FMECA procedure
in which failure modes are sampled using statistical sampling techniques, and their effects are
evaluated under a wide range of operating conditions. Morris’s efficient sampling technique is
used for generating failure mode effect analysis scenarios. The scenarios are evaluated in a K-
Spice simulator with a model of an offshore gas reinjection system in the Danish North Sea. The
impact of the failure modes on the process performance and process safety is evaluated under
varying process conditions. The extended methodology enables fast screening of the effects of the
failure mode under different realistic process conditions. This provides a more comprehensive and
global assessment of the consequences for process safety and reliability in the chemical industry.
Keywords: Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis, Morris screening, Gas reinjection
1. Introduction
For safety-critical systems, tools like FMECA and HAZOP are important in reliability analysis
as well as Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) studies to ensure an inherently safe design and
safe operation of the system. For modern chemical process plants, a model is a requirement in
the design phase. This model should be exploited, not just to ensure mass, energy and momentum
balances of the system, and to optimize productivity, but also to ensure the safety of the sys-
tem. In previous studies simulations are conventionally performed according to a single defined
operational setpoint to evaluate failure modes Enemark-Rasmussen et al. (2012). However as
economical experimental designs are available Morris (1991) and computational power increases,
such evaluations should be carried out by rigorously investigating the influence of failure modes
under a range of potential variation of the process conditions.
In this work we propose a quantitative approach to analyse the effects of failure modes of a control
valve under a range of process conditions. We have identified four failure modes of control valves
on offshore oil and gas platforms that will be simulated under varying process conditions. The
method is more time consuming and computationally expensive than conventional approaches,
especially as the number of process conditions, components and failure modes increases with
system complexity. To avoid an excessively time consuming method, the process conditions, and
the failure modes are sampled by using a random and economically efficient sampling method:
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Morris screening. Morris screening is a discrete sampling method, and allows for evaluation of
different and completely unrelated failure modes in one study.
2. Process system
The approach is applied to an offshore gas reinjection system of Mærsk, that has been modelled in
K-Spice based on design and operation data in Enemark-Rasmussen et al. (2012). The purpose of
the gas reinjection system is to maintain the well pressure for enhanced oil recovery. The feed of
gas from upstream is controlled by a control valve. In the reinjection system the gas is first cooled
by a heat exchanger, supplied with sea water. The cooling rate is controlled by a control valve, at
the outlet of the heat exchanger. Next, the gas enters the scrubber to avoid vapour in the gas being
reinjected to the well. Production of liquids from the scrubber is undesired, however a control
valve releases the liquid to a flare, if the level becomes too high. A compressor sucks the gas from
the scrubber, after which the gas is either reinjected to the wells or recycled. The gas is recycled
to avoid the compressor from surging. Surging is undesirable, however so is recycling the gas as
it limits the productivity. An anti-surge controller controls the setpoint of four control valves, one
for gas feed, two for gas recycling and one for gas reinjection, to ensure a steady flow through the
compressor. The modelled system in K-Spice is shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Offshore gas reinjection system.
Various different failure modes have previously been simulated in K-spice for this system Enemark-
Rasmussen et al. (2012). However common for all simulations was the use of only a single set
of process conditions according to design specifications. The process conditions before and after
introducing the failure mode was used to calculate the sensitivity of the process to assess the crit-
icality of each failure mode using a one-factor-at-a-time approach. In this study, we use a global
sampling based approach to assess the criticality of the consequences, and focus the study on four
failure modes of one control valve evaluated under a range of process conditions.
The effort to document the occurrence of failure modes for valves, pumps etc. is extensive in the oil
and gas industry, however the level of detail on reported failure modes is very sparse Management
(2002); Peters and Sharma (2003). In this study, the valve opening P, and the valve opening and
closing time topen and tclose are used for implementing four different failure modes for the gas feed
control valve. When implementing the failure mode, the manipulated parameter is fixed for the
remaining simulation from t fm to tend . Apart from the failure modes, the sampled initial process
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conditions are the temperature Tgas and the pressure Pgas of the feed gas, and additionally the feed
temperature Tcool of the sea water used for cooling.
The values of the sampled initial conditions is determined by a discrete cumulative distribution
function (CDF). The variation in percentage for the conditions are as follows: Tgas = 5%, Pgas =
4% and Tcool = 4%. As described in Sin et al. (2009), it can be used to determine the minimum
and maximum values of a uniform distribution discretized into p = 4 levels, around a mean or
nominal value of operation. The nominal operation is defined as: Tgas= 44.5 ◦C, Pgas= 121bar and
Tcool = 30 ◦C. Gaussian noise is added to the process conditions as measurement noise and varies
during the simulation. The standard deviation σnoise in Table 3 defines the normal distribution of
the noise, around the values sampled by Morris screening for θ1i,θ2i and θ3i as mean. The noise
is added as part of the simulation in K-Spice, and is sampled randomly by K-spice.
3. Procedure
First a set of k process conditions including the failure mode is sampled as input θ i = [θ1i,θ2i...θki]
for the simulation for i = 1,2 ... n simulations. The n number of sampled sets are then simulated
in K-Spice. All simulations start with a sampled set of initial process conditions θ1i,θ2i and θ3i at
time tstart = 0s. These conditions are used throughout the entire simulation. To allow the system
to stabilize under the set of process conditions specified by the sampling, the simulation is run for
1200 seconds. At time t fm = 1200s the failure mode (FM) θ4 is introduced. Next, the simulation
is run for 7200 seconds until tend = 8400s after which the simulation is stopped, and the simulation
output for every simulation Yi j = [y1i j,y2i j ... ymi j] for j = [10,20 ... tend ] is recorded by sampling
every ten seconds. Here, j denotes a point in the time series of the mth output signal from the ith
simulation. The steps, inputs and outputs of the procedure is shown in Table 3.
# Step Input Output
1 Morris screening r=40, k=4, p=4, ∆= 2/3, CDF θi
2 Load initial conditions in simulation i θ1i, θ2i, θ3i
3 Run simulation i untill t fm = 1200s σNoise = [5, 2.5, 2.5]
4 Introduce failure mode θ4
5 Run simulation i untill tend = 8400s Yi j
6 Sensitivity analysis θi, Yi j EEi
Table 1: Procedure for sampling, simulating and analysing.
4. Experiment and sample design
Morris screening is a global sensitivity analysis method that employs a one-factor-at-a-time (OAT)
approach for producing experimental designs. OAT analysis is performed for a number of ran-
domly sampled nominal values in design space. The analysis is based on the mean and standard
deviation of the elementary effects, EEi for input i to determine how sensitive the outputs are to
changes in the inputs i = 1,2, .... For these experiments k = 4 input parameters are sampled at
p = 4 levels. Typically, the number of repetitions needed for Morris screening is in the range
of r = [10,50] Sin et al. (2009), and based on the required number of elementary effects Fi to
be calculated. For this study r = 40 is used, however only five elementary effects are shown.
Based on this, the number of samples are n = r(k+ 1) = 40(4+ 1) = 200 Sin et al. (2009).
The elementary effects are calculated based on changes to the inputs, defined by the step size
∆ = p/[2(p− 1)] = 4/[2(4− 1)] = 2/3 for a uniform distribution of the sampling space. These
steps are used for performing local sensitivity analysis, however when averaging the mean of the
elementary effects, the method can be used in a global context. The sampled probabilities in unit
hyperspace [0 1] have been converted to real values by using their respective inverse discrete and
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cumulative probability distribution function. The values of the resulting four levels are shown in
table 4.
Level Tgas, θ1 Pgas, θ2 Tcool , θ3 Failure mode (FM), θ4
1 28.6 ◦C 116.2bar 17.9 ◦C Valve seized at current position P
2 39.2 ◦C 119.4bar 26.0 ◦C Valve fail open at P= 1%
3 49.8 ◦C 122.6bar 34.0 ◦C Valve fail close at P= 99%
4 60.4 ◦C 125.8bar 42.1 ◦C Stiction 3 tclose & 3 topen
Table 2: Design space.
5. Results
For each simulation i, the output Yi j is a time series with j samples in time, corresponding to the
sampled input θ i. A selection of the process signals from the simulations are shown in Figure
2. The average of all 200 samples for each time step j is plotted for each output, along with
a lower and upper safety limit. The limits are an average of the 200 process signals for each
output from time tstart to t fm, multiplied by ±25%. In general the control system is capable of
maintaining the temperature close to nominal operating conditions as can be seen on plot 1-5 in
Figure 2. However, under some conditions, the temperature exceeds the upper limit at the gas
outlet, and in the recycle loop. The plots 6-9 shows a stable pressure under the majority of process
conditions, although it drops below the lower limit to nearly 0 bar under some conditions. This
does however not pose a safety risk. Plot 10 shows that the amount of recycled gas varies a
lot between 0 and 200kg/h, and under some specific conditions the recyled amount approaches
300kg/h. In general the productivity is stable, but it drops close to 0kg/h under some conditions.
The surge rate, defined as
∫
Timesurgingdt [s]
Time [s] , varies a lot initially, as expected, and in time splits up
into four dinstinct bands, for which two of them increases over time, one remains constant and one
decreases over time.
Figure 2: A selection of process signals for output Yi j from the n= 200 samples.
The plots shown in Figure 3 of each output as a function of each input shows that failure mode
two is the sole cause of the high temperatures for the gas outlet and recycle loop, independent
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of the process conditions. The plot also shows, that failure mode two is the sole reason for the
pressure drop in the gas reinjection system, as only very little new gas is supplied. On the contrary,
failure mode four consistently produces high pressure with almost no variation. The amount of
recycled gas drops close to 0kg/h for failure mode two as only a small amount of gas is supplied
to the system. Failure mode three causes the high amount of recycled gas for a gas feed pressure
of 125.8bar. As previously mentioned, the productivity is stable, which is true for all process
conditions, except those including failure mode two. Failure mode two results in three bands
of surging, resulting in both the lowest and highest amount of time surged in total. The plots do
however not show any unique set of conditions producing these bands. The variation in the amount
of time surged is very low for both failure mode one and four as opposed to two and three.
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Figure 3: Matrix plot of model output Yi as a function of model input θi.
The most significant elementary effect has the highest average, and a high standard deviation is
an indication of interactions or non-linearity Morris (1991). The elementary effects for some of
the critical outputs are shown in Figure 4. The wedge in the figure can be used as an indication
of significance, and is calculated as the mean of samples of the elementary effects: dˆi =±2SEMi.
The standard error of mean, SEMi is calculated as the variance Si of the elementary effects of input
sample i divided by the square root of repetitions r : SEMi = Si√r . If an elementary effect is outside
of the wedge it is considered significant, and insignificant if inside Morris (1991).
A change in failure mode can be considered as the most influential input parameter on the gas
outlet temperature, recycle loop temperature, amount of gas recycled and the gas productivity, but
shows no significance on the amount of time surged. This result for the total surge rate contradicts
the observations from Figure 3. The values in Figure 4 are averaged elementary effects based on all
changes to the respective input parameter. This can lead to ambiguous results and for this reason
these results cannot be interpreted alone. The gas feed pressure change should also be considered
significant for the increase in gas outlet temperature, and a change in temperature of the cooling
feed is significant for an increase in temperature in the recycle loop. The mean of the total surge
rate shown in Fig. 4 indicates no significant inputs, as the standard error of the mean SEMi is quite
large due to the high variance Si of elementary effects. The estimated mean µ∗ of the distribution
of absolute values of the elementary effects is however useful for Type II errors when the variance
is both negative and positive Campolongo et al. (2007). It reveals that the failure mode is the most
significant parameter for the variation of the surge rate as µ∗ = 5.70 for FM, µ∗ = 5.51 for Tcool ,
6 E. Nielsen et al.
-0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
mean, i
0.2
0.4
0.6
st
de
v,
i
Safety - Gas outlet temperature
Tgas
Pgas
Tcool
FM
-0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2
mean, i
0.2
0.4
0.6
st
de
v,
i
Safety - Recycle loop temperature
TgasPgas
Tcool
FM
-0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
mean, i
0
0.5
st
de
v,
i
Efficiency - Mean recycled gas
Tgas
Pgas
Tcool
FM
-0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
mean, i
0
0.5
st
de
v,
i
Efficiency - Mean productivity
TgasPgasTcool
FM
-0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
mean, i
0.8
1
st
de
v,
i
Efficiency - Total surge rate
TgasPgas
Tcool
FM
Figure 4: Elementary effects of outputs.
µ∗ = 4.02 for Tgas and µ∗ = 3.98 for Pgas.
In general, the standard deviation of the elementary effects of the failure mode is quite large for all
outputs except for the surge rate. However as this input parameter is not continuous, but merely
four completely different parameters in itself, a high standard deviation is expected and should
thus be either interpreted with caution or disregarded.
6. Conclusion
Morris screening has been used for analysing failure modes of a valve under varying process
conditions in simulations of an offshore gas reinjection system. The analysis showed that only the
temperature at the gas outlet and in the recycle loop could compromise the safety, caused by the
gas feed valve closing. In general the results showed that within the studied range of variation the
process conditions are insignificant, and that the effect of the failure modes is independent of the
process conditions. The efficiency of the plant was also examined, and in general the productivity
was stable, except for when the valve closes, and the gas feed is shut off. Additionally, the closed
valve impacts the amount of time which the compressor surged both negatively and positively. In
case of an open valve, the recycling rates increased, but only under high pressure.
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